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Democracy and Nobility
Abstract
Americans love revolutions. Our national identity began with a revolution, and a revolutionary war that lasted
for eight years; and we cheer on other people’s revolutions, as though we find satisfaction in multiplying our
own. “I hold that a little rebellion now and then is a good thing & as necessary in the political world as storms
in the physical,” wrote Thomas Jefferson. “No country should be long without one.” An excited James Garfield,
in his maiden speech in the House of Representatives in 1864, asked whether his colleagues “forget that the
Union had its origin in revolution.” Ralph Waldo Emerson thought of revolution as the authentic instinct of
humanity. “Wherever a man comes, there comes revolution,” he said in his Harvard Divinity School address of
1838. “The old is for slaves.” [excerpt]
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Democracy and Nobility 
Was the Civil War a second American Revolution? 
 
JAN 5, 2015, VOL. 20, NO. 17 • BY ALLEN C. GUELZO 
Americans love revolutions. Our national identity began with a revolution, and a revolutionary war that lasted 
for eight years; and we cheer on other people’s revolutions, as though we find satisfaction in multiplying our 
own. “I hold that a little rebellion now and then is a good thing & as necessary in the political world as storms 
in the physical,” wrote Thomas Jefferson. “No country should be long without one.” An excited James 
Garfield, in his maiden speech in the House of Representatives in 1864, asked whether his colleagues 
“forget that the Union had its origin in revolution.” Ralph Waldo Emerson thought of revolution as the 
authentic instinct of humanity. “Wherever a man comes, there comes revolution,” he said in his Harvard 
Divinity School address of 1838. “The old is for slaves.” 
But sometimes our enthusiasm for revolutions blinds us to 
what is, and what is not, genuinely revolutionary. The English 
geologist and traveler George Featherstonhaugh took the 
temperature of American revolutionary fervor and dismissed 
it as mere patriotic puff, designed only to “stimulate that 
national vanity and self-sufficiency which are often so 
conspicuous in young countries, and to cherish in his fellow-
citizens that inflated feeling of superiority over other nations.” 
So let us be clear about what a revolution is: A revolution is 
an overturning, a reversal of polarity, a radical discontinuity 
with what has gone before. It means, as the sociologist Jeff 
Goodwin wrote, “not only mass mobilization and regime  
change, but also more or less rapid and fundamental social, 
economic and/or cultural change, during or soon after the 
struggle for state power.” 
Stacked against that definition, our founding revolution, and the revolutions that succeeded it, may not be so 
revolutionary after all. At first, the American Revolution presents us with a whopping set of discontinuities: 
The king of England disappears and is replaced by a notion of sovereignty residing in the people; 
democratic governments emerge in the new American states and coalesce in an unprecedented piece of 
formal statecraft, the Constitution; the property of prominent American Tories is confiscated; law-codes must 
be rewritten, and a major debate takes place over whether English common law should still retain authority 
or be superseded by legislative statute. But much of this revolutionary reshaping happened simply by 
elevating the revolutionaries’ already-in-place experiments in self-government to permanent status. “We 
began our Revolution, already possessed of government, and, comparatively, of civil liberty,” said Daniel 
Webster. “Our ancestors had from the first been accustomed in a great measure to govern themselves” and 
“had little else to do than to throw off the paramount authority of the parent state. Enough was still left, both 
of law and of organization, to conduct society in its accustomed course, and to unite men together for a 
common object.” 
In 1843, when one of the last survivors of Lexington and Concord was interviewed by an overanxious 
antiquarian about his reasons for revolution, Captain Levi Preston of Danvers replied simply, “Young man, 
what we meant in going for those Redcoats was this: We always had governed ourselves and we always 
meant to. They didn’t mean we should.” In other words, our revolution was a revolution against a revolution, 
and in defense of an already-existing (albeit de facto) democratic order. The real revolution, we might say, 
was the attempt of the king of England to meddle in those arrangements.  
This ambivalence about revolutions has never been more of a problem than when we speak of the American 
Civil War—as we often do—as a “second” American Revolution, and especially when we are situated near 
the end of the sesquicentennial of the Civil War. James Garfield said in 1864, “Our situation affords a 
singular parallel to that of the people of Great Britain in their great revolution of the seventeenth century.” 
Thaddeus Stevens hoped that Union forces would “free every slave—slay every traitor—burn every rebel 
mansion,” and make the war “a radical revolution.” And nearer our own time, Progressive historians of the 
1920s and 1930s warmed to the notion of the Civil War as a revolution in which (according to Charles 
Beard, who first applied “second American Revolution” to the Civil War) “an industrial and commercial nation 
following in the footsteps of Great Britain” was transformed by “the power of capital, both absolute and as 
compared to land.”  
Certainly there exists quite a long list of discontinuities with the American past that the Civil War opened up 
in American life—in the technology of war, in law and politics, in social relations and economics, and 
culminating in the abolition of slavery. But do these discontinuities amount to a revolution? Are they really 
even discontinuities? 
The most obvious of these discontinuities in the Civil War have to do with the war itself, or rather the 
technology of war, since the received wisdom in military history for the past half-century has been that the 
seemingly endless casualty lists of Civil War battlefields were the product of unimaginative officers 
attempting to use the outdated tactics of Napoleon against the decimating wonder of the newly invented 
rifled musket and rifled artillery. And this technology really was remarkable in many ways. Unlike the trusty 
old British “Brown Bess” musket of the 18th century (which was useless at ranges greater than 80 yards), 
the Civil War-era rifle musket could hit an 11-inch bull’s-eye at 350 yards and could penetrate 6 inches of 
pine board at 500 yards.  
But the rifle musket was not exactly a novelty by the time the American Civil War broke out. It received its 
first practical tests in North Africa in 1846, in the Crimean War of 1853-56, and in the North Italian War of 
1859, and it had attracted quite enough use and attention for two American officers—George Willard and 
Cadmus Wilcox, both of whom fought at Gettysburg—to write handbooks on its use.  
And for all the improvements in range and accuracy created by the rifle musket, it was still a black-powder, 
paper-cartridge muzzle-loader which required a cumbersome sequence of nine separate steps (known as 
“load in nine times”) to load. Although the optimum firing-rate was three rounds per minute, the practical 
reality under battlefield conditions was closer to one round every four to five minutes. Moreover, its fabled 
improvements in accuracy were also fatally limited: The rifling in the barrel which gave its bullets a self-
correcting spin also slowed its velocity significantly from that of the old Brown Bess—from 1,500 to 1,115 
feet-per-second—and allowed the bullet to drop as much as 14 feet over 300 yards. This, in turn, required 
the installation of back sights on the various brands of rifle muskets, which forced the shooter to raise the 
rifle upwards before firing. In effect, the bullet was not so much fired as it was dropped (and this dropping is 
echoed in numerous Civil War descriptions of combat in which bullets are said to have “dropped in 
showers”). So, whatever was gained in terms of pinpoint targeting had to be paid for by continuous mental 
adjustments for the movement of targets—and the actual environment of combat was not conducive to 
careful mental adjustments. “What precision of aim or direction can be expected,” asked one British officer, 
when “one man is priming; another coming to the present; a third taking, what is called, aim; a fourth 
ramming down his cartridge,” and all the while “the whole body are closely enveloped in smoke, and the 
enemy totally invisible?”   
The answer, of course, was not much. After the battle of Stone’s River, Union major general William S. 
Rosecrans worked out a general estimate of how many shots needed to be fired to inflict one hit on the 
enemy, and came up with the astounding calculation that 20,000 rounds of artillery fired during that battle 
managed to hit exactly 728 men; even more amazing, his troops had fired off 2 million rifle cartridges and 
inflicted 13,832 hits on rebel infantry. In practical terms, this was still the sort of combat where men could 
stand upright on the battlefield with a fairly healthy margin of safety; the staggering length of the casualty 
lists was the result not of modernized weapons, but of the inexperience of both volunteer officers and 
soldiers in charging home with the bayonet and the consequent bogging-down of lines of battle in motionless 
exchanges of fire. The real revolution in weapons technology would occur not in the Civil War, but with the 
adoption of breech-loading rifles as standard infantry arms in the Franco-Prussian War of 1870-71. In that 
respect, far from being revolutionary, the weapons of the Civil War made it the last of the Napoleonic Wars 
rather than a revolutionary harbinger of the Western Front. 
It has been argued that the Civil War was a revolution in warfare thanks to railroad transportation and the 
electrical telegraph. But once again, the military application of neither the railroad nor the telegraph was an 
innovation of the American Civil War. Both were put to their first practical test by the British Army in the 
Crimean War, and in 1859 Napoleon III took the railroads one step further, using them for troop 
transportation into northern Italy against the Austrians. French railroads moved 76,000 men in just 10 days, 
and in the run-up to the battles at Magenta and Solferino, it took some of Napoleon III’s regiments only five 
days to reach their concentration point in northern Italy from Paris. 
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